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Bulletin No. 74 of the U. S. Bureau of Labor, dated January,
I9O8, and issued in May, is a document of the utmost importance
to anyone who is interested in the subject of Employers' Liability.
We know of no publication which can be compared with it for
complete presentation of the present status of that subject. It begins
with an admirable treatise of 120 pages on the American law upon
the subject, which is followed by the text of all American consti-
tutions and statutes which alter the common law, including the
statutes of i9o7. To this is added a clear statement of the law
of each of the European countries and their dependencies as to
employer's liability, with the full text of the British Workmen's
Compensation Act of 19o6, and of the Canadian Industrial Disputes
Investigation Act of I9o7; and a statement of the more important
decisions of American courts on labor questions during the past
year. This statement of the contents will show that the pamphlet is
indispensable to any one who desires to investigate any phase of this
most important subject. E.P.
DAMAGES UPON REPUDIATION OF A CONTRACT.
In the April number of this journal Professor Joseph H. Beale,
Jr., sets forth very clearly the principles governing the measure of
damages in cases of anticipatory repudiation of a contract. It seems
to the writer than in one respect only is a criticism to be made of
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his analysis. Professor Beale shows convincingly that where "the
plaintiff sues at once for an anticipatory breach of the contract, his
damages are to be assessed according to the cost of performance,
not at the time of the breach, but at the time set for performance."
To this rule, however, he says there may be one exception: where
parties have made a contract for the future delivery of a commodity
of such a nature that the right to its future delivery has a present
market value, and an anticipatory breach occurs, the measure of
the damages is not the value of the contract at the time for per-
formance, but the value of the contract at the time of the
breach. The example given is a sale of oats for July delivery, and
a repudiation occurs in April. July oats have a market value in
April representing the April value of the contract right to July oats.
It is submitted that even such a case as this is no exception to the
general rule.
In the first place, all contract rights to a future performance have
a present value, and in every case such value is different from the
value of performance at the time set by the contract, and different
from the value of a precisely similar performance at the present time.
The fact that some contract rights or "futures" are quoted on an
exchange while others are not, has no bearing upon the underlying
principle. That fact merely goes to show that in some cases there
is in existence first class evidence of the present value of a contract
right to a future performance, while in other cases there may be
little or none. This might be a pracfical reason for laying down
different rules for the measure of damages in the two cases, but it
is not a logical one. It may indeed be true that in all cases of an
anticipatory breach the injured party should be given the present
market value of his contract right as of the time of such breach.
He ought not to complain at such a rule, for he himself is a con-
senting party. In all cases he has his option between acquiescing
in the repudiation and rejecting it; and he should reject it in case
he wishes the value of the contract at the time set for performance.
This is a question forced upon us by the anticipatory breach doctrine
as discovered in Hochster v. Delatour. But as Professor Beale
shows, the question is no longer open, and the rule as to the measure
of damages is that quoted at the beginning of this discussion.
In the second place, Professor Beale's reasons for the rule that
"the repudiator of a contract cannot under any circumstances call
upon the other party to make forward contracts for his benefit"
are almost as conclusive against allowing the repudiator of a con-
tract to escape on paying the market value of the contract right as
HeinOnline -- 17 Yale L.J. 612 1907-1908
6Z2 ALE LAW JOURNAL
his analysis. Profe sor Heale shows convincingly that here "the
plaintiff sues at once for an anticipatory breach of the contract, his
damages are to be assessed according to the cost of performance,
not at the ti e of the breach, but at the ti e set for p"erformance."
To this rule, ho ever, he says there ay be one exception: here
parties have ade a contract for the future delivery of a co odity
of such a nature that the right to its f ture elivery has a resent
arket value, and an anticipatory breach occurs, the easure of
the da ages is not t e alue f the contract t the time for per-
for ance, but the lue of the tract t the ti e of the
breach. he e a ple i en is a sale f oats for ly li r , and
a repudiation occurs i pril. July ts e arket value in
pril representing the pril alue f t e tract right t July ats.
It is sub itted t at such se t i is eption t t e
eral rule.
In the first lace, ll tract ts t t re erfor ance
a r s t l , d i ery l e ifferent fr
value of perfor ance t t ti e t y t e tract, ifferent
fro the value f r is l i il r rfor ance t r sent .
he fact t at s tr t t futures" ted
exchange ile t ers r , aring rlying
principle. t f t r l re
is i e iste ce fir t l i t l e r ct
right to a f t re rf r , il r t re
little or none. his i t di l
different rules f r t re , t
is not a logical one. It i
anticipatory reac t i j r t t
arket value of is tr t ri t .
e ought t t l i t CGn-
senting rt . ll i scing
in the re iati j ti
i t l t .
is is sti f r
i ster . latour.
s s, t ti i
f s i t t t i
I t l ,
"t r i t r a ir
upon t e t r t t f f r i it"
are al ost as l si i t t a
tract to escape o i t l t c t ri
COMMENTS
of the time of the anticipatory breach. Allowing the injured party
only that amount, is in effect requiring him to make a forward con-
tract for the benefit of the repudiator, depriving him of any benefit
from the forward contract, though insuring him against any loss
from it. The fact that the injured party is insurdd against any loss
to accrue from the forward contract does not add to the merit of the
rule. If anything, it detracts from it. The injilred party has fore-
casted the future. He is entitled to profits accruing after the antici-
patory breach as well as before. But to get them he must now make
a forward contract based upon a new forecast. If the injured
party's original forecast was bad, he should bear the losses conse-
quent thereon, those accruing subsequent to the breach as well as
before. In this case, he is not in fact an injured party at all.
The repudiation is not an injury but a positive benefit. -Yet the
rule would require the repudiator to pay damages for conferring
a benefit; or to express it in another way, would require the
repudiator to pay the damages caused by the making of the forward
contract. As Professor Beale says: "The fact is that the repu-
diator is entitled to the benefit of no contract of the other party
except such as the other party could not have made but for the
repudiation." And likewise, the fact is that the repudiator should
be made to bear the burden of no contract except that which he
has himself made.
Suppose the following: A sells to B i,ooo bushels of wheat at
$I.o0 per bushel for delivery July i. On April i, wheat having
risen, and July wheat being then quoted at $i.io, A repudiates.
Wheat continues to rise in price, and on July i is quoted at $1.20
for immediate delivery. Under these circumstances, B should be
entitled to $200.00. If on April i B makes a forward purchase
for July delivery of another i,ooo bushels of wheat at $i.io, he
is entitled to his profit of $ioo.oo thereon, in addition to the
$2oo.oo on the first contract. But if B can hold A for damages
based only upon the April price of July wheat, then B gets only
$2oo.oo profit on the two contracts instead of $300.00. Again,
suppose that after April i the price of wheat declines and on July
i is once more $I.o0 per bushel for immediate delivery. On July
i, the time for performance, B could buy in the market for $i.00,
the contract price, and has lost nothing by reason of A's repudiation
and non-performance. He should therefore not be given $io0.o0
of A's money. In case B made a forward contract on April i, as
before, at $I.Io, the $oo.o0 loss thereon should not be borne by A.
In case B sues A and the trial occurs before July i, the thing
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to be proved is the prospective value of the wheat on July I,
although the best evidence of what it will be is perhaps the market
quotation of July wheat at the day of trial. A. L. C.
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ERDMANN ACT OF 1898.
The Supreme Court of the United States dealt a deadly blow to
labor unions in a recent decision, Adair v. United States, 28 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 277, holding unconstitutional section io of the Erdmanti Act
passed in i898, for this cut out the very heart of the entire Act. The
real question in the case was, may Congress make it a criminal
offence against the United States-as, by the ioth section of the Act
of 1898, it does,-for an agent or officer of an interstate carrier,
having full authority in the premises from the carrier, to dis-
charge an employee from service simply because of his member-
ship in a labor organization? The majority of the court based their
opinion on the fact that in interfering with freedom of contract it
was an unwarranted invasion of the right to personal liberty and
property guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Also that the Act was
not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of Art. I, Sec. 8, of
the Constitution, One dissenting Justice argues that because of the
purpose, to wit: the prevention of strikes, it is not a "gross per-
version of the principle" of regulation and that because of the nature
of the rights, namely, those exercised in a quasi-public business, they
are subject to control in the interest of the public. The other dis-
senting Justice, admitting it to be a limited interference with free-
dom of contract, attempts to justify it on the grounds of public
policy.
The rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment are some-
thing more than mere privileges of locomotion; the guaranty is
the negation of arbitrary power in every form which results in a
deprivation of a right. It is well recognized, however, that this
right is limited to a certain extent by the "police power," both in
the States (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 391),and in Congress,whose
power, however, is not general but rests upon the enumerated powers
given it by the Constitution. Vid., dissenting opinion, Lottery Case,
188 U. S. 365; Freund on Police Power, Sec. 65. But this must not
be a mere pretext-become another and delusive name for supreme
sovereignty-to be exercised free from constitutional restraint.
Lotkner v. New York, ig U. S. 56.
Going now to the second ground on which the unconstitutionality
is put, denying that the government can invoke the aid of the com-
merce clause to sustain the indictmentraising as it does a much more
complex and embarrassingly difficult constitutional question and
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